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In a dynamic model of ﬁnancial market trading multiple heterogeneously in-
formed traders choose when to place orders. Better informed traders trade imme-
diately, worse informed delay — even though they expect the public expectation to
move against them. This behavior causes distinct intra-day patterns with decreasing
(L-shaped) spreads and increasing (reverse L-shaped) volume and probability of in-
formed trading (PIN). Competition increases market participation and causes more
pronounced spread and less pronounced volume patterns. Systematic improvements
in information increase spreads and volume. Very short-lived private information
generates L- or reverse J-shaped volume patterns, which are further enhanced by
competition.
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†katya.malinova@utoronto.ca and andreas.park@utoronto.ca.One persistent empirical ﬁnding in analyses of stock market trading data is that volume
and spreads display intra-day patterns. These patterns diﬀer across markets and across
the analyzed time spans, but, most commonly, the spread declines and volume increases
toward the end of the trading day. For instance, NYSE historically displayed U- or re-
verse J-shaped spreads and volume (Jain and Joh (1988), Brock and Kleidon (1992),
McInish and Wood (1992), Lee, Mucklow, and Ready (1993), or Brooks, Hinich, and Pat-
terson (2003)), but recent evidence (Serednyakov (2005)) suggests L-shaped spreads after
decimalization; NASDAQ has L-shaped spreads and U-shaped volume (Chan, Christie,
and Schultz (1995)); London Stock Exchange has L-shaped spreads and reverse L-shaped
volume (Kleidon and Werner (1996) or Cai, Hudson, and Keasey (2004)).1
Persistent patterns in transaction costs have long puzzled researchers — why trade
at high transaction costs mid-day when on average costs are lower at the end of the
trading day? The existing literature, discussed below, provides several explanations, such
as periodic variations in uninformed trading or short-lived information advantages. We
identify a new channel. In our model, intra-day patterns arise endogenously through
the dynamic behavior of heterogeneously informed traders. We further contribute to the
literature by deriving novel predictions on how key market features such as competition
among traders, transparency through information release policies, and the structure of
private information aﬀect these patterns.
The theoretical model underlying our analysis is in the tradition of Glosten and Mil-
grom (1985). Liquidity is supplied by a competitive, uninformed, and risk neutral market
maker. Traders either place orders for reasons outside the model (e.g., to rebalance their
portfolio), or they have private information about the security’s fundamental value. In
contrast to Glosten and Milgrom, we allow the latter traders to choose the time of their
trade and we admit an uncertain number of traders.
1There are many other examples. For instance, the Taiwan and the Singapore Stock exchanges have
L-shaped spreads and reverse L-shaped volume or number of transactions (Lee, Fok, and Liu (2001) for
Taiwan, Ding and Lau (2001) for Singapore).
1As a ﬁrst step in our analysis, we verify that our model is consistent with the afore-
mentioned, common patterns in observables. At each point in time the market maker
sets a bid price and an ask price. Traders with private information expect prices to move
against them because they believe that their peers likely possess similarly favourable or
unfavourable information.2 This eﬀect is stronger, the more conﬁdent traders are about
their information. Consequently, the best informed traders act early, causing a wide
bid-ask spread. Less well informed trader are unwilling to accept this wide spread and,
further, they do not expect prices to move by much. They are thus happy to delay, causing
a natural separation and a declining (L-shaped) spread pattern across time.
The bid-ask-spread is aﬀected, loosely, by the average information quality of active
traders and by the probability that an informed trader is active. In the degenerate case
with only one trader, spreads must coincide across time. As a trader with better informa-
tion would move early, on average the informed trader transaction rate must be increasing
across time, leading to a reverse L-shaped volume pattern. This intuition extends to sit-
uations with more than one trader.
Our ﬁrst main result determines the impact of competition among traders. As the
expected number of traders rises, traders are increasingly concerned that the price moves
against them and more traders act early to capitalize on their information. This mutes
the reverse L-shaped volume pattern and leads to a more pronounced L-shaped spread
pattern. Notably, the steeper decline in spreads leads to an overall increase in market
participation. Competition for information rents thus does not deter but attracts market
entry and allows traders to beneﬁt from weaker information.
The second main result concerns the impact of a possible public signal that renders
private information obsolete after the ﬁrst period of trading. As traders believe that their
information may be very short lived, they feel compelled to act sooner. We then predict
that as the threat of an information release increases, the L-shaped spread pattern becomes
2Transaction prices in our model are a martingale and information is independent, conditional on the
security’s fundamental value. This causes private information to be unconditionally correlated.
2more pronounced and the reserve L-shaped volume pattern becomes muted. When traders
perceive their private information to be suﬃciently short-lived, volume declines over time.
Our third empirical prediction concerns the impact of systematic improvements of
private information. Such an improvement can occur, for instance, when a company
adopts or a regulator imposes a new disclosure policy that fosters transparency.3 Our
model predicts that, ceteris paribus, stocks of companies with such new policies exhibit
higher total volume and higher spreads. Further, L-shaped spread patterns are more
pronounced and reverse L-shaped volume patterns are less pronounced.
Our fourth result relates volume and the probability of informed trading (PIN), which
is a widely used empirical measure of adverse selection costs (Easley, Kiefer, O’Hara, and
Paperman (1996)). PIN assesses the degree of activity by informed traders, and our model
predicts that PIN follows the pattern of volume. We thus predict that spreads and PIN,
two main measures of adverse selection costs, will display opposite patterns when volume
and spreads display opposite patterns. The intuition behind the discrepancy is that PIN
captures the chance of encountering an informed trader, whereas the spread additionally
accounts for the level of the informational advantage of such a trader.
The literature has developed several explanations for persistent variations in observable
variables. Admati and Pﬂeiderer (1988) analyze a setting in the tradition of Kyle (1985)
and attribute periods of concentrated trading to the timing decisions of discretionary liq-
uidity traders. Informed traders do not time their actions as their information is viable for
only one period. The period with highest activity is determined by exogenous parameters
and thus, in principle, their model admits any pattern. Foster and Viswanathan (1990)
analyze a single informed trader model and show that inter-day variations in volume and
transaction costs arise when there is release of public information.4 We complement their
3Related to this are many examples of incremental or even dramatic improvements in economy wide
information quality, such as the advent of new data sources or new computing tools that allow faster
processing of data. Our model then delivers testable predictions for event studies of such changes.
4Other eﬀects caused by the timing decision of a single informed trader have been analyzed in, for
instance, Back and Baruch (2007) (order splitting), Chakraborty and Yilmaz (2004) (price manipulation),
and Smith (2000) ((no-) timing in absence of bid-ask spreads).
3work and oﬀer predictions on the impact of competition and information structures.
Finally, employing an inventory based trading model, Brock and Kleidon (1992) show
that U-shaped volume can be caused by demand shocks that traders experience during
periods of market closure. The monopolistic market maker then exploits this pattern
and charges U-shaped spreads. Our analysis complements this line of work by studying
competitive liquidity provision in a setting with asymmetric information.
Overview. Section 1 outlines the model, Section 2 derives the equilibrium. Section 3
studies the eﬀect of an increase in competition between traders on market participation.
Section 4 discusses the patterns of spreads, volume and PIN. Section 5 analyzes the impact
of a possible release of public information. Section 6 determines the eﬀect of systematic
improvements in private information. Section 7 discusses the results. Appendix A expands
on the information structure. Appendix B complements the main text by providing the
proofs and further details of the analysis. Table 1 summarizes the results.
1 The Model
1.1 Overview of the Market Structure
We formulate a stylized model of security trading, in which traders trade single blocks of a
risky asset with a competitive market maker. Our model builds on Glosten and Milgrom
(1985) (hereafter, GM) but we assume that more than one trader may arrive at the same
time and we allow traders to time their transactions.
There are two trading periods. At the beginning of period 1, before trading com-
mences, the fundamental value of the security is realized (but not revealed) and some
investors receive private information about this value. These traders are rational and
trade to maximize their expected proﬁts. If not informed, a trader may experience a
liquidity shock forcing him to buy or sell.5
Trading is organized by a competitive market maker who posts ‘bid’-prices, at which
5Throughout the paper we will refer to market makers as female and investors as male.
4she is willing to buy the security, and oﬀer-prices (‘ask’), at which she is willing to sell.
These quotes are ‘good for’ the size of a single block, and the market maker expects to
break even when the quote is hit by a single order. If multiple orders arrive simultaneously,
they exceed the minimum ﬁll size for posted orders, and new quotes are negotiated.
The value of the security is revealed at the end of period 2, after the market closes.
Traders who hold the asset obtain its cash value and consume. Short positions are ﬁlled
at the fundamental value.
1.2 Model Details
Security: There is a single risky asset with a liquidation value V from a set of two
potential values V = {0,1}. The two values are equally likely.
Market maker: The market maker is risk-neutral and competitive. She does not have
private information and sets prices to break even, conditional on the public information.
Traders: With probability α there are two traders, with probability 1 − α there is
only one trader.6 A trader is equipped with private information about the value of the
security with probability µ ∈ (0,1). The informed investors are risk neutral and rational.
If not informed (probability 1 − µ), a trader may experience a liquidity shock.7 To
simplify the exposition, we assume that this liquidity shock occurs with probability 1,
that it is equally likely to occur in either of the two trading periods, and that it forces
the trader to buy or sell with equal probabilities.
Informed traders’ information: We follow most of the GM sequential trading
literature and assume that traders receive a binary signal about the security’s fundamental
value V . These signals are private, and they are independently distributed, conditional
6Most results in this paper numerically extend to a setting with an arbitrary number of traders
determined by a Poisson process; the qualitative insights remain unaﬀected.
7Assuming the presence of traders who trade for exogenous reasons (‘noise’) is common practice in














































Figure 1: Illustration of signals and noise. This ﬁgure illustrates the structure of information
and noise trading. First, it is determined whether a trader is informed (probability µ) or uninformed
(probability 1 − µ). If informed, the trader obtains a signal quality qi. Next, he receives the “correct”
signal (h when V = 1 and l when V = 0) with probability qi and the “wrong” signal with probability
1−qi. (The draw of V is identical for all traders.) If the trader is not informed, he experiences a liquidity
shock in Periods 1 and 2 with equal probabilities.
on V . Speciﬁcally, trader i is told “with chance qi, the value is High/Low (h/l)” where
pr(signal|true value) V = 0 V = 1
signal = l qi 1 − qi
signal = h 1 − qi qi
This qi is the signal quality. In contrast to most of the GM literature, we assume that these
signals come in a continuum of qualities, and that qi is trader i’s private information. The
distribution of qualities is independent of the security’s true value and can be understood
as reﬂecting, for instance, the distribution of traders’ talents to analyze securities.
In what follows, we will combine the binary signal (h or l) and its quality on [1/ 2,1] in a
single variable on [0,1], namely, the trader’s private belief that the security’s fundamental
6value is high (V = 1). This belief is the trader’s posterior on V = 1 after he learns his
quality and sees his private signal but before he observes the public history. A trader’s
behavior given his private signal and its quality can then be equivalently described in
terms of the trader’s private belief. This approach allows us to characterize the equilib-
rium in terms of a continuous scalar variable (as opposed to a vector of traders’ private
information) and thus simpliﬁes the exposition.
Trader i’s belief is obtained by Bayes Rule and coincides with the signal quality if the
signal is h, πi = pr(V = 1|h) = qi/(qi+(1−qi)) = qi. Likewise, πi = 1−qi if the signal is l.
Appendix A ﬂeshes out how the distributions of beliefs are obtained from the underlying
distribution of qualities and provides several examples. Figure 1 illustrates the structure
of information and liquidity trading.
Public and private information: The number of traders in the market is not
revealed, except possibly through submitted orders. The identity of an investor (informed
or liquidity), his signal and his signal quality are his private information. Past trades
and transaction prices are public information. We will use H to summarize the public
information about everything that occurred in period 1.
Trading protocol: There are two trading periods, t = 1,2. As in GM, each trader
can post at most one market order to either buy or sell one block of the security at prices
determined by the market maker. An informed trader in our setting can additionally
choose the period to submit his order in.8 Informed traders choose the period and the
direction of their trade (or to abstain from trading) to maximize their expected proﬁts.
The market maker’s bid and ask quotes take into account the information that single
sell and buy orders, respectively, would reveal. When two orders arrive at the same time,
the market maker may quote a new price to each of the traders. When faced with an
updated quote, a trader is allowed to reject it. If he does, then this trader leaves the
market and makes zero proﬁts.9 Figure 2 illustrates traders’ choices.
8Our results are qualitatively robust to allowing a fraction of liquidity traders to time their trades.
9Since trading is non-anonymous, a trader who rejects the new price in period 1 and returns later
7The assumption that traders may reject the updated quotes reﬂects the reality that
block orders are commonly traded oﬀ the exchange at mutually agreed upon prices, and it
is thus unlikely that a block trader faces uncertainty about the execution price. We would
like to emphasize, however, that this assumption is not crucial to our results. We will
show that, in equilibrium, traders will always accept the updated quotes. This implies,
in particular, that equilibrium transaction prices in our model would also constitute an
equilibrium in a dealer market setting in the tradition of Kyle (1985), where traders
ﬁrst submit market orders and the market maker then sets the transaction price upon
observing the order ﬂow. As one of this paper’s goals is to describe the eﬀect of timing
and competition on the dynamics of the bid-ask spread, we have chosen the formulation
that admits such a description over the dealer market alternative.
1.3 Trading Equilibrium
Quotes: At the beginning of period t the market maker posts a bid- and an ask-price;
the bid-price bid
t is the price at which she buys exactly one unit of the security, the
ask-price ask
t is the price at which she sells exactly one unit. With zero expected proﬁts,
these quotes coincide with the market maker’s conditional expectation of the fundamental
ask
t = E
M[V |buy at ask
t, public info at t], bid
t = E
M[V |sale at bid
t, public info at t].
If only a single order arrives, then it clears at the quoted price. If there are two orders,
then the market maker updates the quotes based on the information revealed by the
orders. Buyers and sellers are then quoted new prices
ask
t
new = EM[V |other order and buy at ask
t, public info at t],
bid
t
new = EM[V |other order and sale at bid
t, public info at t].
is identiﬁed and thus cannot proﬁt from doing so. Further, we will show that a trader who initially
submitted a buy order will never want to sell upon hearing the new quotes.
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Figure 2: Decision Possibilities and Possible Outcomes from the Perspective of one Trader. In each period, when (a) there is no other
trader, (b) there is another trader who does not trade, or (c) the other trader has already traded (applies only to period 2), the trader has to pay the
quoted ask price, ask
t, or will obtain the quoted bid price, bid
t. If there is another trader who submits an order, then the market maker will update
her expectation and quote a new price. The trader then has the choice to either accept or reject this quote. Trading ends for a trader if he rejects a
quote.
9The informed investor’s optimal choice: An informed investor enters the market
in period 1. He can submit a buy or a sell order in this period, or he can delay his decision
until period 2. A trader who does not submit his order in either of the two trading periods
makes zero proﬁts. As discussed earlier, if two orders are submitted at the same time,
each trader will be quoted an updated price and can then choose to either proceed with
his order or to abstain from trading.
Equilibrium concept: We will restrict attention to monotone threshold decision
rules. Namely, we will seek an equilibrium where traders with suﬃciently encouraging
(discouraging) signals buy (sell) in period 1 and those with information of worse quality
choose to delay their decision until period 2. Further, we will focus on a symmetric
equilibrium, where quality thresholds are independent of the trader’s identity and, absent
transactions, buyers and sellers require signals of (or above) the same quality to trade. If
an equilibrium is not unique, we select the volume maximizing equilibrium.
More formally, we will look for an equilibrium such that a trader buys in period 1
if his private belief πi ∈ [π1
b,1] and sells in period 1 if πi ∈ [0,π1
s]; that he buys in
period 2 if his private belief πi ∈ [π2
b(H),π1
b) and sells if πi ∈ (π1
s,π2
s(H)]; and that he
abstains from trading otherwise (where period 2 thresholds may depend on the period 1
history H). Symmetry with respect to buying and selling implies that π1
b = 1 − π1
s and
that, conditional on H = ‘no transaction at t = 1’, π2
b(H) = 1 − π2
s(H). The volume
maximizing equilibrium has the lowest πt
b and the highest πt
s.
2 Equilibrium Analysis
We proceed in three steps. We ﬁrst outline general properties of the equilibrium. Second,
we describe the equilibrium in period 2, and third we discuss the equilibrium in period 1.
Figure 3 summarizes the equilibrium decisions.
102.1 General Properties
Threshold decision rules, together with conditional independence of the traders’ signals,
imply that the probability of order history ot, conditional on the security’s fundamental
value being V = v and the trader’s private information, is independent of the trader’s pri-
vate belief, pr(ot|V = v,π) = pr(ot|V = v). The trader’s expectation of the fundamental




πpr(ot|V = 1) + (1 − π)pr(ot|V = 0)
, (1)
and it is increasing in the private belief, conditional on any order history.
In a symmetric equilibrium, the expectation of a trader with private belief π = 1/2
coincides with that of the market maker, E[V |ot,π = 1/ 2] = EM[V |ot], for any order history.
As the market maker’s quotes account for the information revealed by the order, the ask










with equality on either side only if all traders buy or sell. The above discussion implies
Lemma 1 (Separation of Trading Decisions) A trader with private belief π > 1/2
would never sell, a trader with private belief π < 1/2 would never buy, and a trader with
private belief π = 1/ 2 would never trade.
In what follows, we will discuss the decision of a trader with private belief π > 1/ 2 in
more detail; the discussion for the case of π < 1/ 2 is analogous. Employing Lemma 1, at
the beginning of period 1 a trader with private belief π > 1/ 2 chooses between submitting
a buy order and delaying his trading decision until period 2. He will submit a buy order
in period 1 only if he expects to (i) make non-negative expected trading proﬁts and (ii)
these proﬁts exceed those that he expects to make by delaying until period 2. This trader
11thus needs to ﬁrst forecast his period 2 trading decision and proﬁts, conditional on all
possible period 1 transaction histories (a buy, a sale, or a no trade).
2.2 The Trading Decision in Period 2
We ﬁrst ﬁx the period 1 trading thresholds, π1
b = π1 and π1
s = 1−π1, and ﬁnd the period 2
trading thresholds for each of the period 1 trading histories. An informed investor with
a private belief π > 1/ 2 submits a buy order in period 2 if, conditional on his information
and the period 1 transaction history, the expected ask price is at or below his expectation
of the security’s fundamental value. He abstains from trading otherwise.
In a monotone equilibrium, this trader will submit a buy order after period 1 history H
if his private belief π is at or above the belief of the marginal buyer who is exactly indiﬀer-
ent between submitting a buy order and abstaining from trade, π2
b(H,π1). To characterize
trader π’s period 2 decision, it thus suﬃces to ﬁnd the threshold belief π2
b(H,π1).
Suppose ﬁrst that there is a buy in period 1. Conditional on a buy order in period 2, the
market maker will know that (i) there were two traders in the market, (ii) the period 1
buy order came either from a liquidity trader (and is thus uninformative) or from an
informed trader with private belief between π1 and 1, and (iii) the period 2 buy order
came either from a liquidity trader or from an informed trader with private belief between
π2
b(‘buy at t = 1’,π1) and π1.
Since traders’ decisions are independent, conditional on the fundamental value, a
trader in period 2 and the market maker will derive the same information about the
fundamental from (i) and (ii). For the marginal buyer’s expectation to equal that of the
market maker (which is the ask price), this buyer must derive the same information from
his private signal as the market maker does from (iii). The latter point is the equilibrium
condition. We show in Appendix B that this marginal buyer uniquely exists.
Consider now the case of no transaction in period 1. A trader who submits a buy order
in period 2 knows that he may receive an updated quote from the market maker, and
12that he will be allowed to reject the new quote if it is ‘too high’.10 This option to reject
has a non-negative value, and it is hypothetically possible for the marginal buyer to make
negative expected proﬁts at the posted ask price and positive proﬁts if presented with
an updated quote. Appendix B shows, however, that this cannot happen in equilibrium,
and that the marginal buyer in period 2 will break even, conditional on any period 2
order history. Further, this marginal buyer is independent of the period 1 transaction
history, π2
b(H,π1) = π2
b(π1). Finally, the marginal seller is symmetric, π2
s(π1) = 1−π2
b(π1).
In what follows, we drop the subscripts and use π2(π1) = π2
b(π1) for the marginal buyer.
Lemma 2 (Marginal Traders in Period 2) For any π1 ∈ (1/ 2,1), there exist a unique
π2 ∈ (1/2,π1) such that any trader with private belief π ∈ [π2,π1) buys in period 2, any
trader with private belief π ∈ (1 − π1,π2] sells in period 2, and any trader with private
belief π ∈ (1 − π2,π2) abstains from trading. Further, π2(π1) increases in π1.
2.3 The Trading Decision in Period 1
Similarly to period 2, we can ﬁnd a trader who is indiﬀerent between buying in period 1
and abstaining forever if he is perceived to be the marginal buyer. Denote this buyer’s
belief by π∗. Lemma 2 showed, however, that if perceived to be the marginal buyer in
period 1, trader π∗ will make positive expected proﬁts by delaying and submitting his buy
order in period 2. Consequently, the marginal buyer in period 1, π1, must be above π∗.
Trader π1 will thus make strictly positive trading proﬁts, conditional on any order
history, and he will always accept an updated quote if presented with it. He solves
E[V −ask
1|π




1,H,I submit B at t = 2 ]|π
1￿
, (2)
where trader π1 conditions on himself being the marginal buyer in period 1, on trader
π2(π1) being the marginal buyer in period 2, and on symmetric marginal sellers. Using
10By Lemma 1, this trader will never choose to sell upon hearing the updated quote.
13trade in period 1
do not trade in period 1
buy if noise or if π ∈ [π1
b,1]
sell if noise or if π ∈ [0,π1
s]
trade in period 2
do not trade in period 2
buy if noise or if π ∈ [π2
b,π1
b)
sell if noise or if π ∈ (π1
s,π2
s]
no trade if π ∈ (π2
s,π2
b)
Figure 3: Equilibrium Behavior. This ﬁgure illustrates an informed trader’s equilibrium choices. He
acts in period 1 if his private belief is either low or high, and he delays otherwise; similarly in period 2.
the fact that updated quotes are always accepted, we can apply the Law of Iterated
Expectations and rewrite equation (2) as a condition on the expected ask prices
E[ask
1|π




1,H,I submit B at t = 2 ]|π
1￿
. (3)
Theorem 1 (Existence of a Symmetric Equilibrium) There exist π1,π2 with 1/ 2 <
π2 < π1 < 1 such that any trader with private belief π ∈ [π1,1] buys in period 1, any
trader with private belief π ∈ [π2,π1) buys in period 2, and no trader with private belief
π < π2 buys. Selling decisions are symmetric.
3 Competition and Market Participation
To better understand traders’ incentives, consider ﬁrst the case of α = 0, when there is
only one trader in the market. In a monotone equilibrium, this trader will buy in period 1
14if his private belief π is at or above π1, and he will buy in period 2 if his private belief π is at
or above π2 > 1/ 2 but below π1. Being alone in the market, the trader can perfectly forecast
the period 2 ask quote. Further, by the Law of Iterated Expectations, he cannot expect
his expectation of the fundamental to change from period 1 to period 2. Consequently,
conditional on submitting a buy order, this trader will always submit his order in period 1
if the period 1 ask price is lower than the period 2 ask price, ask
1 < ask
2, and vice versa.
For this trader to trade in either period, depending on his belief, we must have ask
1 = ask
2,
or in other words, the adverse selection costs must coincide across periods. Lemma 5 in
Appendix B shows that this equality uniquely determines trader π1.11
At ﬁrst sight, it may seem counterintuitive that prices coincide across periods. Casual
intuition suggests that the bid-ask spread should be wider in period 1 because informed
traders there have higher quality information. This intuition does not recognize , however,
that the size of the spread depends not only on the information that informed traders
possess but also on the chance that an informed trader with the relevant information exists.
For prices to coincide, the market maker must be more likely to encounter an informed
trader in period 2 than in period 1. In the single trader equilibrium the information
quality and informed trader scarcity eﬀects exactly oﬀset one another.12
The observation that the volume of informed trading is higher in period 2 is also the
key insight to the results that we discuss in the next section.
Now suppose that a trader faces potential competition from another block trader,
α > 0. The trader’s decision then depends on two factors: the (expected) spreads and
the price impact of a competing order. The ﬁrst key observation is that a trader with
favourable information believes that another informed trader, should he be present, is
11Note that the situation with α = 0 is degenerate in the sense that all informed types are indiﬀerent
between trading at any time. With competition, α > 0, non-marginal traders strictly prefer to trade in
one period or the other.
12This insight is in contrast to Smith (2000): under the information structure here, Smith would predict
that a single trader always wants to trade early. The reason for the discrepancy is that in Smith a trader
has no price impact and thus faces a zero bid-ask spread.
15more likely to buy than to sell.13 Thus traders expect the public expectation to move
against them and they will only delay if the spread in period 2 is smaller than in period 1.
The second key observation is that the higher a trader’s information quality is, the
more he expects the public expectation to move. Thus for traders with high quality
information, a lower period 2 spread is an insuﬃcient incentive to delay and they choose
to trade at the larger period 1 spread. Crucially, although traders with low quality
information also expect the public expectation to increase, they expect the ask price in
period 2 to be lower than the period 1 ask price.
We show that, compared to the no competition case, in equilibrium more traders act
early. Further, and somewhat surprisingly, as competition increases, traders require lower
quality information to submit orders and thus market participation increases.
Proposition 1 (Competition and Market Participation) As the probability α that
another trader is present increases, market participation increases in period 1 and in
periods 1 and 2 combined: π1 and π2 decrease.
4 Patterns in Observables
Empirically, observable variables display intra-day patterns. Spreads are L-shaped on
most markets, examples are NASDAQ (Chan, Christie, and Schultz (1995)), the London
Stock Exchange (Kleidon and Werner (1996) or Cai, Hudson, and Keasey (2004)), Taiwan
(Lee, Fok, and Liu (2001)) and Singapore (Ding and Lau (2001)). Early evidence for
NYSE suggested that spreads are reverse J-shaped (Jain and Joh (1988), Brock and
Kleidon (1992), McInish and Wood (1992), Lee, Mucklow, and Ready (1993), or Brooks,
Hinich, and Patterson (2003)) but there is recent evidence that the spread pattern has
become L-shaped after decimalization (Serednyakov (2005)).
13Signals and actions are independent across traders, conditional on the true value, but unconditionally
they are correlated.
16The patterns of volume diﬀer across markets.14 On NYSE and NASDAQ volume is U-
or reverse J-shaped. On the London Stock Exchange, volume is reverse L-shaped, with
two small humps, one in the morning and the other in the early afternoon. Other world
markets, for instance, the Taiwan and the Singapore Stock exchanges also have a reverse
L-shaped volume or number of transactions.
We will argue now that our model generates patterns in observable variables that are
consistent with the above empirical observations. Namely, spreads in our model decline
from period 1 to period 2 and are thus arguably L-shaped. Volume patterns depend
on how short-lived traders perceive their private information to be. If the information
is perceived to last through the trading day, then volume will increase from period 1
to period 2 and is thus, arguably, reverse L-shaped. If, however, traders believe that
their information is very short-lived (for instance, due to the potential release of public
information), then volume will decrease from period 1 to period 2 and can be viewed as
L- or reverse J-shaped. We will also discuss how the level of competition and changes in
information quality aﬀect the predicted volume and spread patterns.
In this section we will continue to assume that traders’ private information lasts until
the end of period 2. In Section 5, we will relax this assumption and investigate the eﬀect
of a possible release of public information after period 1.
4.1 Spread Patterns





In models with asymmetric information the size of the spread is associated with the
implied adverse selection costs. To facilitate the comparison, we compare the prices that
are quoted at the beginning of period 1 with those that are quoted at the beginning of
period 2 in absence of transactions in period 1.
14The references are the same as for spreads.
17The dynamic behavior of spreads in our model is driven by the monotonicity of decision
rules and the incentive compatibility of trading. As discussed in the last section, in
presence of competition adverse selection costs in period 1 are higher than in period 2.
Further, as competition increases, the spread widens in period 1 and it narrows in period 2.




1 increases and spread
2 decreases.
Proposition 2 implies, in particular, that the diﬀerence in spreads spread
1 − spread
2 in-
creases as competition increases. In other words, stronger competition leads to a more
pronounced L-shaped spread pattern.
4.2 Volume Patterns
We proxy volume by the probability that a given market participant trades, which is the
probability of a buy plus the probability of a sale,
vol
t = pr(a given trader buys at t) + pr(a given trader sells at t).
As the competition parameter α increases, there will be more traders and thus more
transactions, ceteris paribus. Our measure is not contaminated by this direct eﬀect of an
increased number of traders but instead captures volume per capita.
In the last section we argued that volume must increase from period 1 to period 2
for the single trader case (α = 0). Our numerical analysis shows that the same holds
for any α > 0. Further, by Proposition 1, as competition increases, more traders act
in period 1 and overall. Our numerical results show that more traders act in period
1 relative to period 2 so that the reverse L-shaped pattern becomes less pronounced.
Figure 4 illustrates the following observation.
Numerical Observation 1 (Volume) For every level of competition α ≥ 0, vol
2 >
vol






















Figure 4: Volume Patterns. Competition parameter α is on the horizontal axis, vol
1 − vol
2 is on the
vertical axis, the probability of an informed trader is set to µ = .4. Each line corresponds to a parameter
of the quadratic quality distribution outlined in Appendix A; the parameters are θ ∈ {−6,0,6,12}. While
the volume diﬀerence increases in α, it remains negative, and volume in period 1 is lower than in period 2.
4.3 Patterns in the Probability of Informed Trading
Adverse selection costs in the context of Glosten-Milgrom sequential trading models are
commonly measured by the “probability of informed trading” (PIN), introduced by Easley,
Kiefer, O’Hara, and Paperman (1996). PIN is deﬁned as the ratio of the probability of
an informed transaction to the total probability of a transaction.15
PIN
t =
pr(a given trader acts in t) − pr(a given trader is a noise trader)






We distinguish PIN for periods 1 and 2, where to facilitate the comparison, PIN in period 2
assumes no transactions in period 1. Relation (4) implies the following.
Proposition 3 (PIN) PIN
t displays the same intra-day pattern as vol
t.
15See Hasbrouck (2007), Ch. 6; the formula there has an additional parameter, which is 1 in our setting.




2. Surprisingly, even though spread is
larger in period 1, PIN is larger in period 2. In other words, these two measures of adverse
selection costs disagree. The reason for the discrepancy is that PIN captures the chance of
encountering an informed trader whereas the spread additionally accounts for the level of
the informational advantage (or the average information quality) of an informed trader.
5 The Impact of a Public Information Release
In the analysis presented thus far private information was assumed to be viable for two
periods. We will now relax this assumption and discuss a situation where the private
information may become obsolete after period 1. Private information may lose its value,
for instance, because of a public announcement that perfectly reveals the fundamental
value. Denoting the probability of such an announcement by 1−δ, δ ∈ [0,1], equation (2),
which determines the marginal buyer π1, becomes16
E[V − ask
1|π
1,I buy at t = 1] = δ   E
￿
E[V − ask|π




Similarly to Proposition 2, for any δ, the bid-ask spread in period 1 is larger than in
period 2. We further ﬁnd numerically that the L-shaped spread pattern becomes more
pronounced as the probability of the public information release increases (δ decreases).
When an information release is very unlikely (δ is large), volume is reverse L-shaped as
before. However, when an information release is likely (δ is not too large), volume in
period 1 exceeds volume in period 2. In other words, volume is L-shaped (or, arguably,
reverse J-shaped) when traders perceive their private information to be very short-lived.
Figure 5 illustrates the following ﬁnding.





2 increase. Further, there exists a δ⋆ such that vol
1 > vol
2 for all δ ≤ δ⋆.
16Our existence proof assumes δ = 1, but can accommodate δ < 1 with minor modiﬁcations.
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Figure 5: Explicit Discounting: Comparative Static. The probability of an informed trader is
set to µ = .4. Each line corresponds to the parameter of the quadratic quality distribution outlined in
Appendix A; the parameters are θ ∈ {−6,0,6,12}. The competition parameter is set to α = 1. The
discount factor δ is on the horizontal axis. The left panel plots the diﬀerence of period 1 and 2 volumes,
the right panel plots the diﬀerence in the period 1 and 2 bid-ask spreads.
Observation 1 from the last section illustrated that as competition increases, the dif-
ference in volumes, vol
1−vol
2, increases. This insight extends for δ < 1. If the probability
of a public information release is low and volume in period 2 exceeds that in period 1, then
competition causes the reverse L-shaped volume pattern to be less pronounced. However,
if the probability of an information release is high and period 1 volume exceeds that in
period 2, then increased competition enhances the L-shaped pattern.
6 Systematic Changes in the Information Structure
Our analysis of competition thus far has focussed on the expected number of traders.
Traders, however, care not only for presence or absence of competition but also for the
quality of information that the other trader may possess. We will now study how system-
atic changes in the distribution of information qualities aﬀect observable variables.
These changes may occur when there is a persistent shift in the fraction of traders who
are better informed or more capable at processing information. An example is an increase
21in analyst coverage for a stock, as this would improve the average trader’s information. A
stock may also attract a more informed clientele when it gets included in a major index,
because major funds will add it to their portfolios. With such an inclusion, the company
often faces additional disclosure requirements, further aﬀecting the distribution of traders’
signal qualities. Many of these changes are observable and the predicted impacts can be
tested empirically. Additionally, the quality of analysts’ earnings forecasts can serve as a
proxy for the average information quality.
Formally, one would model improvements in information quality by shifts in the un-
derlying distribution of qualities in the sense of ﬁrst order stochastic dominance (FOSD).
A systematic improvement in information quality corresponds to a situation in which
the “new” quality distribution ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates the “old” one so that
under the new distribution, traders have systematically higher quality information. The
analysis in this section is based on the quadratic signal quality distribution that is out-
lined in Appendix A. This class of distributions is parameterized by a parameter θ, which
corresponds to the slope of the distribution’s density. An increase in θ invokes a ﬁrst
order stochastic dominance shift. Figure 6 illustrates the following observation.
Numerical Observation 3 (Information Quality) Fix δ = 1. As the information










Observation 3 implies, in particular, that the L-shaped spread pattern becomes more
pronounced, and that the reverse L-shaped volume pattern becomes less pronounced.
When information quality systematically increases, traders compete with on average
better informed peers. In order to trade, they require higher quality information in both
periods. At the same time, the concentration of traders with high quality information
increases, yielding the intuition for the observation on volume.
22q















































































Figure 6: Information Quality: Comparative Static. The probability of an informed trader is set
to µ = .4. Each line in each panel is a function of the information quality parameter θ and corresponds
to a level α ∈ {0,.2,.5,1}. The top left panel plots spread
1 (upper half of the lines) and spread
2 (lower
half of the lines). The top right panel plots the diﬀerence of the period 1 and 2 spreads (it contains three
lines as the diﬀerence in spreads for α = 0 is zero). The bottom left panel plots total volume, the bottom
right panel plots the diﬀerence in volumes for period 1 and 2. As can be seen, spreads, spread diﬀerences,
total volumes, and volume diﬀerences all increase in θ.
237 Conclusion
The purpose of this study is to understand informed traders’ timing decisions and the
impact of these decisions on major economic variables. We predict that the heterogeneity
in traders’ informational advantages generates distinct intra-day volume and spread pat-
terns. The predicted behavior is consistent with stylized facts that volume increases and
spread declines toward the end of the trading day on most international stock exchanges.
The literature has identiﬁed other causes for variations in volume and transaction costs,
such as discretionary liquidity traders (Admati and Pﬂeiderer (1988)) or the release of
public information (Foster and Viswanathan (1990)). Our model is consistent with these
causes, as including them would generally enhance the volume and spread patterns that
we identify. We further provide novel predictions on how competition, possible releases of
public information, and the informational environment aﬀect the patterns in observables.
These predictions are facilitated by our choice of the underlying model. Analyzing
a framework in the tradition of Glosten and Milgrom (1985) with a continuous signal
structure allows us to study an uncertain number of traders, to explicitly describe bid-
ask spreads, and to provide novel predictions on patterns in the probability of informed
trading, a common measure of adverse selection costs (see, e.g., Hasbrouck (2007)).
A Appendix: Quality and Belief Distributions
The information structure used in this paper is as in Malinova and Park (2009). Financial
market microstructure models with binary signals and states typically employ a constant
common signal quality q ∈ [1/ 2,1], with pr(signal = h|V = 1) = pr(signal = l|V = 0) = q.
This parameterization is easy to interpret, as a trader who receives a high signal h will
update his prior in favor of the high liquidation value, V = 1, and a trader who receives
a low signal l will update his prior in favor of V = 0. We thus use the conventional
description of traders’ information, with qualities q ∈ [1/ 2,1], in the main text.
24As discussed in the main text, to facilitate the analysis, we map a vector of a trader’s
signal and its quality into a scalar continuous variable on [0,1], namely, the trader’s
private belief. To derive the distributions of traders’ private beliefs, it is mathematically
convenient to normalize the signal quality so that its domain coincides with that of the
private belief. We will denote the distribution function of this normalized quality on
[0,1] by G and its density by g, whereas the distribution and density functions of original
qualities on [1/ 2,1] will be denoted by ˜ G and ˜ g respectively.
The normalization proceeds as follows. Without loss of generality, we employ the
density function g that is symmetric around 1/2. For q ∈ [0, 1/2], we then have g(q) =
˜ g(1 − q)/2 and for q ∈ [1/ 2,1], we have g(q) = ˜ g(q)/2.
Under this speciﬁcation, signal qualities q and 1−q are equally useful for the individual:
if someone receives signal h and has quality1/ 4, then this signal has “the opposite meaning”,
i.e. it has the same meaning as receiving signal l with quality 3/4. Signal qualities are
assumed to be independent across agents and independent of the fundamental value V .
Beliefs are derived by Bayes Rule, given signals and signal qualities. Speciﬁcally, if
a trader is told that his signal quality is q and receives a high signal h then his belief
is q/[q + (1 − q)] = q (respectively 1 − q if he receives a low signal l), because the prior
is 1/2. The belief π is thus held by people who receive signal h and quality q = π
and by those who receive signal l and quality q = 1 − π. Consequently, the density of
individuals with belief π is given by f1(π) = π[g(π)+g(1−π)] when V = 1 and analogously
by f0(π) = (1 − π)[g(π) + g(1 − π)] when V = 0. Smith and Sorensen (2008) prove the
following property of private beliefs (Lemma 2 in their paper):
Lemma 3 (Symmetric beliefs, Smith and Sorensen (2008)) With the above signal
quality structure, private belief distributions satisfy F1(π) = 1−F0(1−π) for all π ∈ (0,1).
Proof: Since f1(π) = π[g(π) + g(1 − π)] and f0(π) = (1 − π)[g(π) + g(1 − π)], we
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Figure 7: Plots of belief densities and distributions. Left Panel: The densities of beliefs for an
example with uniformly distributed qualities. The densities for beliefs conditional on the true state being
V = 1 and V = 0 respectively are f1(π) = 2π and f0(π) = 2(1 − π); Right Panel: The corresponding
conditional distribution functions: F1(π) = π2 and F0(π) = 2π − π2.





π[g(π) + g(1 − π)]





One can recover the distribution of qualities on [1/2,1], denoted by ˜ G, from G by
combining qualities that yield the same beliefs for opposing signals (e.g q = 1/ 4 and signal













g(s)ds = 2G(q) − 2G(
1/ 2) = 2G(q) − 1.
An example of private beliefs. Figure 7 depicts an example where the signal quality q
is uniformly distributed. The uniform distribution implies that the density of individuals
with signals of quality q ∈ [1/ 2,1] is ˜ g(q) = 2q. When V = 1, private beliefs π ≥ 1/ 2 are held
by traders who receive signal h of quality q = π, private beliefs π ≤ 1/ 2 are held by traders
who receive signal l of quality q = 1−π. Thus, when V = 1, the density of private beliefs
π for π ∈ [1/ 2,1] is given by f1(π) = pr(h|V = 1,q = π)˜ g(q = π) = 2π and for π ∈ [0, 1/ 2]
it is given by f1(π) = pr(l|V = 1,q = 1 − π)˜ g(q = 1 − π) = 2π. Similarly, the density
conditional on V = 0 is f0(π) = 2(1 − π). The distributions of private beliefs are then
F1(π) = π2 and F0(π) = 2π − π2. Figure 7 also illustrates that signals are informative:
26recipients in favor of V = 0 are more likely to occur when V = 0 than when V = 1.
Signal quality distributions for simulations. In our numerical simulations we em-










+ 1, q ∈ [0,1]. (6)
The feasible parameter space for θ is [−6,12] and includes the uniform density for θ = 0.
Moreover, for θ′ > θ′, ˜ Gθ′ ﬁrst order stochastically dominates ˜ Gθ as ˜ Gθ′(q) < ˜ Gθ(q) for all
q ∈ [1/ 2,1].
B Appendix: Omitted Proofs
B.1 Some General Results and Notation
We will ﬁrst introduce some notation and establish basic results that facilitate the analysis
and proofs of our main results.
B.1.1 General notation for all proofs
Using Bayes Rule and conditional independence of traders’ private beliefs, an informed
trader’s expectation of the security’s fundamental value, conditional his private informa-




πpr(V = 1|ot) + (1 − π)(1 − pr(V = 1|ot))
. (7)
In other words, a trader’s expectation of V can be expressed in terms of his private belief π
and his prior p = pr(V = 1|ot) (the probability that the value is V = 1, conditional on
the order history but not on the trader’s private belief), where the latter summarizes the
information from the order ﬂow that is relevant for estimating the fundamental value. In
what follows, we will use EV [π;p] to denote a trader’s expectation of the fundamental,
27conditional on this trader’s private signal and his prior p.
Similarly, we will use function a(π,π;p) to denote the liquidity provider’s expectation
of the security value, given prior p, conditional on a buy order that stems from either a
noise trader drawn from a mass of size λ, or from an informed trader drawn from a mass
of size µ and equipped with a private belief between π and π. Conditional on the true
value being V = v, the probability of such an order is βv(π,π) = λ + µ(Fv(π) − Fv(π)).










This speciﬁcation will allow us to compactly express the equilibrium ask prices. Further,
we will use function π∗(π;p) to denote π that solves
EV (π;p) = a(π,π;p), (9)
and we will use Π(p) to denote π that solves
EV (π
∗(π;p);p) = a(π,1;p). (10)
Functions π∗(π;p) and Π(p) will be useful in expressing the equilibrium thresholds and
their bounds, and we study their properties in more detail in the next subsection.
B.1.2 Preliminary Properties
In what follows, it will often be mathematically convenient to express the private belief




s g(s) ds, F0(π) = 2
Z π
0
(1−s) g(s) ds ⇒ F1(π)+F0(π) = 2G(π), (11)
28and integrating by parts,




Lemma 4 (Properties of the equilibrium thresholds)
(a) For every π such that 1/ 2 < π < 1, there exists a unique π ∈ (.5,π) that
solves equation (9). This solution is independent of prior p: π∗(π;p) = π∗(π).
(b) π∗(π) increases in π: ∂π∗/∂π > 0.
(c) For ﬁxed π, π = π∗(π) maximizes a(π,π;p). Further, a(π,π;p) increases
in π for π < π∗(π) and it decreases in π for π > π∗(π).




λ + µ(F1(π) − F1(π))
λ + µ(F0(π) − F0(π))
, (13)
thus the solution does not depend on the prior p. Using (11) and (12), we rewrite (13) as
2µG(π)(π − π) − 2µ
Z π
π
G(s) ds − λ(2π − 1) = 0. (14)
Denote the left hand side of the above equation by ψ(π,π). Then
(i) ψ(π,π) strictly decreases in π for π ≤ π: ∂ψ/∂π = −2λ − 2µ(G(π) − G(π)) < 0;
(ii) at π = 1/ 2, ψ(1/ 2,π) = 2µG(π)(π − 1/ 2) − 2µ
R π
1/2 G(s) ds > 0;
(iii) at π = π, ψ(π,π) = −λ(2π − 1) < 0.
Steps (i) − (iii) imply existence and uniqueness of π∗(π).
Proof of (b): Applying the Implicit Function Theorem and diﬀerentiating both sides of






2µ(G(π) − G(π∗(π))) + 2λ
> 0,
since π∗(π) ∈ (1/ 2,π) and G is increasing.













where the last equality follows from equation (5). Observe that this last equality coincides
with equation (13). Consequently, there exists a unique π that maximizes a(π,π;p) and
this π = π∗(π).
By (8), a(π,π;p) increases in π when β1(π,π)/β0(π,π) increases in π. Using (5), (11),
and (12), it can be shown that (∂/∂π)(β1(π,π)/β0(π,π)) > 0 when ψ(π,π) > 0. The
desired slopes then follow from part (a).
Lemma 5 For every prior p, there exists Π(p) ∈ (.5,1) that solves equation (10). This
solution is independent of p: Π(p) = Π.







By Lemma 4, π∗(π;p) = π∗(π), and thus the solution does not depend on the prior p. For
the remainder of this proof, LHS refers to the left-hand side of (16) and RHS refers to
the right-hand side of (16).
To prove that the solution exists and is unique, we apply Lemma 4 to observe that (i)
for π ≤ π∗(1) LHS<RHS, as π∗(π)/(1 − π∗(π)) < π/(1 − π) ≤ β1(π,1)/β0(π,1) ; (ii) at
π = 1 LHS>RHS, as as π∗(π)/(1 − π∗(π)) > 1 = β1(π,1)/β0(π,1) and ﬁnally, (iii) LHS
is increasing in π for all π, and RHS is decreasing in π for π > π∗(1).
30B.2 Existence: Proof of Theorem 1
The existence proof proceeds in four steps, by backward induction. We ﬁrst show that
for any given marginal buyer in period 1, π1, there exists a unique marginal buyer in
period 2, π2, who is indiﬀerent between trading and abstaining from trade (and thus
prove Lemma 2). Step 2 veriﬁes that monotone decision rules in period 2 are incentive-
compatible. Step 3 shows existence of π1 ∈ (π∗(1),Π), and Step 4 veriﬁes the incentive-
compatibility of monotone decision rules in period 1.
Step 1: For all π1 ∈ [1/2,1] there exists a unique period 2 marginal buyer, π2, who
is indiﬀerent between submitting a buy order and abstaining from trade for any
period 1 outcome (buy, sell or no trade). Further, π2 = π∗(π1) and thus d
dπ1π2 > 0.
Proof: Suppose ﬁrst that there is a buy in period 1. The dealer then knows that this buy
order came either from a noise trader or from an informed trader with a private belief
between π1 and 1. If a buy order also arrives in period 2, she will additionally learn that
(i) there are 2 traders and (ii) the second trader is either a noise trader or an informed
trader with a private belief between π2 and π1. Applying Bayes Rule, the ask price quoted
in period 2, ask











B = β1(π1,1)/(β1(π1,1) + β0(π1,1)). Likewise, conditionally on a buy order in
period 1, trader π2 updates his expectation to
E[V |B in 1, π
2] =
π2β1(π1,1)





The indiﬀerence condition for the marginal buyer is then EV (π2;p1
B) = a(π2,π1;p1
B), and
the marginal buyer is given by π2 = π∗(π1) by Lemma 4. The case with a sale in period 1
is analogous, and π2 = π∗(π1).
31Suppose now that there is no trade in period 1. A trader in period 2 must then account
for the possibility that there may be a second block order, in which case he will be quoted
an updated ask price and may elect to abstain from trading. Denote the initial quoted
period 2 ask price by ask
2(NT) and the updated quotes, conditional on the other trader




S(NT). The zero expected proﬁt
condition for the marginal buyer π2 can then be written as follows:
0 = (1 − pr(B in 2|NT in 1, π
2) − pr(S in 2|NT in 1, π
2)) ×
￿




+pr(B in 2|NT in 1, π
2)max
￿





+pr(S in 2|NT in 1, π
2)max
￿






where the expectations and probabilities are with respect to trader π2’s information set.
When computing these, the trader conditions on his private belief being the marginal one
as well as on the observed actions of the other trader (accounting also for the possibility
of being alone in the market). The option to reconsider the trading decision in the event
of a second block order has a non-negative value, as the trader may choose to abstain
from trading upon hearing the updated quote. Thus, hypothetically, the marginal trader
may be willing to accept losses at the initial quoted price and expect to proﬁt in the event
that there is a second block order. In what follows, we will show that this does not occur.
In equilibrium, a trader will not change his decision, the value of the option to reconsider
is zero, and the marginal buyer π2 will be indiﬀerent between trading and abstaining for
any action of the second trader (as well as in the absence of the other trader). In the
process, we will argue that this marginal buyer must satisfy π2 = π∗(π1).
The quoted ask price, ask
2(NT), reﬂects the dealer’s expectation of the fundamental
conditional on (i) a buy order in period 2 and (ii) no other trade in either period. This
occurs when (i) there is a single trader and he buys in period 2, or (ii) there are two
32traders, one of them buys in period 2 and the other elects to abstain from trading. In a
symmetric equilibrium, the probability that a trader abstains from trading when V = v
is given by Fv(π2)−Fv(1−π2), and by Lemma 4 it is independent of the fundamental V .
The quoted ask price in period 2 can then be simpliﬁed to ask
2(NT) = a(π2,π1; 1/ 2).
Likewise, a trader in period 2 knows that his buy order will execute at the initial
quoted ask price, ask
2(NT), when (i) he is alone in the market, or (ii) the second trader is
present but chooses to abstain from trading. The probability of receiving the quoted ask
price ask
2(NT) thus does not depend on the value of the fundamental, and the trader’s
conditional expectation is given by
E[V |NT in 1, NT in 2, π
2] =
pr(NT in 1, NT in 2|V = 1)π2
pr(NT in 1, NT in 2|π2)
= π
2 = EV (π
2;
1/ 2)
Lemma 4 then implies that any trader π2 > π∗(π1) whose order is executed at the
initial quoted price ask
2(NT) will make positive expected proﬁts when he is assumed to
be the period 2 marginal buyer; any trader π2 < π∗(π1) will make negative trading proﬁts
in this scenario; and trader π2 = π∗(π1) will make zero proﬁts.
If two buy orders arrive in period 2, the dealer would quote an updated ask price.
Denoting p2




B). When receiving such quote, trader π2 will learn that there
is a second buyer in the market and will update his expectation of the fundamental to
E[V |NT in 1, B in 2, π2] = EV (π2;p2
B)
Lemma 4 then implies that any trader π2 > π∗(π1) will accept the updated ask price
ask
2
B(NT) and make positive expected proﬁts, any trader π2 < π∗(π1) will reject the new
price and make zero proﬁts, and trader π2 = π∗(π1) will be exactly indiﬀerent between
trading and abstaining. Analogously, the same decisions and proﬁts obtain for the updated
ask price in the event of a buy and a sale, ask
2
S(NT).
33We have thus shown that when trader π2 submits a buy order and is assumed to be
the marginal trader, then (i) when π2 > π∗(π1), he will make positive expected proﬁts
for any realization of the other trader’s actions (or in the absence of the other trader),
(ii) when π2 < π∗(π1), he will make negative trading proﬁts if his order executes at
the initial ask price and zero proﬁts if he receives an updated quote (hence, negative
proﬁts in expectation), and (iii) when π2 = π∗(π1), he will make zero proﬁts in all cases.
Consequently, π2 = π∗(π1) is the unique marginal trader in period 2.
Step 2: Monotone decision rules in period 2 are incentive compatible in equilibrium: for
given marginal traders π1,π2 = π∗(π1), (i) any trader π > π2 who ﬁnds himself in
period 2 will submit a buy order and will accept an updated price quote if presented
with it; (ii) no trader π < π2 will buy.
Proof: Observe ﬁrst that the quoted price depends only on the marginal traders, thus
all traders receive the same quotes. Next, by Step 1, for any realization of the trading
history, these quotes coincide with the expectation of the marginal trader π2, conditional
on this history. Step 2 then follows as traders’ expectations increase in private beliefs; see
equation (1).
Step 3: There exists a period 1 marginal buyer, π1 ∈ (π∗(1),Π), who is indiﬀerent
between submitting a buy order in period 1 and delaying until period 2. Further,
there does not exist a period 1 marginal buyer outside these bounds.
Proof: Analogously to the argument in Step 1, we can show that any trader π1 < π∗(1)
would make negative expected proﬁts from submitting a buy order in period 1, when he
is assumed to be the marginal buyer in period 1. It is thus necessary that π1 ≥ π∗(1). By
the same argument, any trader π1 ≥ π∗(1) will make non-negative proﬁts in this scenario
and will accept an updated price quote in period 1, if presented with it. Further, by
Step 2, if trader π1, who is assumed to be the marginal trader in period 1, delays trading
34until period 2, then he will make positive expected proﬁts from submitting a buy order
then and will always accept the updated ask quote, if presented with it, as π1 > π∗(π1).
The marginal buyer π1 in period 1 must be indiﬀerent between submitting his buy
order in period 1 and submitting it in period 2. The indiﬀerence condition for this trader is
E[V −ask
1|I submit B at t = 1, π1] = E[E[V −ask
2|I submit B at t = 2, π1,H1]|π1]. Since
the marginal trader always accepts the quote once the order is submitted, we can use the
Law of Iterated Expectations and rewrite the indiﬀerence condition as
E[ask
1|I buy in 1, π
1] − E[E[ask
2|I buy in 2, π
1,H1]|π
1] = 0. (17)
When computing these conditional expectations trader π1 accounts, in particular, (i) for
himself being the marginal buyer in period 1 and (ii) for trader π2 = π∗(π1) being the
marginal buyer in period 2.
Denote the left-hand side of (17) by ξ(π1). We will show (a) that ξ(π∗(1)) > 0 and
(b) that ξ(Π) < 0. The desired existence of π1 then follows by continuity. We will then
show (c) that there does not exist a marginal buyer π1 > Π.
Part (a) We show that ξ(π∗(1)) > 0. Set π1 = π∗(1). We can show, similarly to the proof
of Step 1, that EV (π∗(1), 1/ 2) = E[ask
1|I buy in 1, π∗(1)]. Thus showing that ξ(π∗(1)) > 0
is equivalent to showing that
EV (π
∗(1),
1/ 2) − E[E[ask
2|I buy in 2, π
∗(1),H1]|π
∗(1)] > 0. (18)
We will denote the realized total number of buys and sales in period 2 by b2,s2,
respectively, and use H1 for the period 1 transaction history. Using the Law of Iterated





pr(b2,s2,H1)(E[V |b2,s2,H1;I buy in 2,π
∗(1),H1] − E
M[V |b2,s2,H1]) > 0,
35The above inequality is satisﬁed, because, by Step 1, the market maker’s conditional ex-
pectation of the fundamental EM[V |b2,s2,H1] coincides with that of the period 2 marginal
trader π2, and the latter is below the expectation of the marginal trader in period 1,
E[V |b2,s2,H1;I buy in 2,π∗(1),H1], by Lemma 4, since π2(π1) < π1, for any history.
Part (b) We show that ξ(Π) < 0. Set the marginal buyer in period 1 to be π1 = Π, and
the marginal buyer in period 2 to be π2 = π∗(Π). The price impact of a trader’s action is









In a symmetric equilibrium, this implies, in particular, that the quoted (initial and up-
dated) ask prices depend only on the total number of buy and sale block orders but not
on the time of the order submission. Consequently, the only scenario, in which the price
that the trader pays will depend on the period that he submits his order in, is when (i)
there are 2 traders and (ii) the second trader trades (buys or sells) in period 2.
To shorten the exposition, we will omit the arguments from the function βv and use βt
v





0, the conditional probabilities do not, β1
v  = β2
v). To show
that ξ(Π) < 0, we need to show that the marginal buyer π1 = Π expects to pay more
in period 2 than in period 1, conditional on there being 2 traders and the second trader





































Observe that (i) the price that the trader pays conditional on the other trader buying in
period 2, [1+(β2
0/β2
1)2]−1, exceeds that paid conditional on the other trader selling, 1/ 2; (ii)
probabilities of the other trader buying and selling in period 2, conditional on him trading







1) > 1/ 2. Replacing Π with β2
1/(β2
0 +β2
1) will thus decrease the weight
on the larger ask price and increase the weight on the smaller one (keeping the sum of
these weights at 1), thereby decreasing the left-hand side of (19):

































Part (c): We show that the marginal trader in period 1 must be π1 < Π. We will argue that
ξ(π1) < 0 for π1 > Π. When π1 > Π, the price impact of a trader’s buy order is stronger
in period 2 than in period 1. Consequently, conditional on being alone in the market or
on the other trader abstaining from trading, trader π1 expects to pay a higher price in
period 2 than in period 1. We can also show, similarly to the argument at the beginning
of Step 1, that conditional on the second trader being present and trading in period 1,
trader π1 will prefer to submit his buy order in period 1. Hence, to argue that ξ(π1) < 0,
it suﬃces to show that trader π1 expects to pay a higher price in period 2, conditional on
the other trader being present and trading in period 2, or that the left-hand side of (19)
exceeds [1+(β1
0/β1





Step 4: The monotone decision rules in period 1 are incentive compatible in equilibrium:
given marginal traders π1 and π2 = π∗(π1), (i) any trader π > π1 buys in period 1
and accepts an updated quote, if presented with it; (ii) no trader π < π1 will buy
in period 1.
Proof: First, by the proof of Step 3, any trader π > π1 will accept the updated quote
in either period. To show that the monotone decision rules are incentive compatible, it
thus suﬃces to show that for given marginal traders {π1,π2}, the diﬀerence between the
price that trader π expects to pay if he submits his buy order in period 1 and that if he
submits his buy order in period 2 is decreasing in π. (A trader will buy in period 1 only
if this diﬀerence is negative).
37The quotes that trader π receives are determined by the marginal types and thus do
not depend on π. Denote the diﬀerence between the (updated) ask quote in period 1 and
the (initial) ask quote in period 2, conditional on the other trader buying in period 1 by
∆(B1); denote this diﬀerence, conditional on the other trader selling in period 1 by ∆(S1);
likewise for ∆(B2) and ∆(S2); and denote the diﬀerence between the initial price quotes
in periods 1 and 2, conditional on no other trader acting, by ∆(NT). Continue to use
βt
v for the probability of a buy in period t, conditional on V = v, given marginal buyers
π1,π2 = π∗(π1), and use γ to denote the (equilibrium) probability that a trader abstains
from trading. The expected price diﬀerence for trader π is then given by
E[ask
1|I trade in 1, π] − E[ask
2|I trade in 2, π] = (1 − α + αγ)∆(NT)
+α(πβ
1
1 + (1 − π)β
1







1 + (1 − π)β
2





where trader π conditions on traders π1 and π∗(π1) being the marginal buyers. Diﬀeren-









0)(∆(B2) − ∆(S2)) < 0. (20)
Observe that (i) βt
1 > βt
0 for t = 1,2; (ii) ∆(B2) − ∆(S2) = 1/ 2 − [1 + (β2
0/β2
1)2]−1 < 0, as
the quote in period 1 is unaﬀected by the other trader’s action in period 2. It thus suﬃces
to show that ∆(B1) − ∆(S1) < 0. In what follows, we will compress the notation further
and denote the period t likelihood of a buy for V = 0 relative to V = 1 by lt = βt
0/βt
1.
Using this, ∆(B1) = 1/(1 + (l1)2) − 1/(1 + l1l2), and ∆(S1) = 1/ 2 − 1/(1 + l2/l1). Step 3
implies that, in equilibrium 1 > l2 > l1, and it thus suﬃces to prove that
1





1 + l1l2 −
1
1 + l2/l1 for l
2 > l
1. (21)
38Observe that (i) the left-hand side of (21) is independent of l2, and (ii) at l2 = l1, the left-
hand side coincides with the right-hand-side. To prove inequality (21), it thus suﬃces to
prove that its right-hand side increases in l2 for ﬁxed l1. Diﬀerentiating the right-hand side
with respect to l2 and rearranging, the derivative is positive if and only if 1+l1l2 > l1+l2.
The latter inequality is true by Chebyshev’s inequality.17
B.3 Competition: Proof of Proposition 1
For each level of competition α, we will use ξ(π1,α) to denote the left-hand side of equation
(17) and π1(α) to denote the equilibrium period 1 marginal buyer.18 By Lemma 2, the
second period marginal buyer π2(π1) increases in π1 and the marginal seller is symmetric,
1−π2(π1). Consequently, (i) the volume maximizing equilibrium obtains for the lowest π1
that solves ξ(π1,α) = 0, and (ii) it suﬃces to prove that π1 decreases in α. Take ˜ α >
α. To show that π1 decreases in α, it suﬃces to show that ξ(π1(α), ˜ α) < 0, or that
∂ξ
∂α|π1=π1(α) < 0. For, since ξ(π∗(1); ˜ α) > 0 by Step 3 of Theorem 1, by continuity, there
must exist ˜ π1 ∈ (π∗(1),π1(α)) such that ξ(˜ π1, ˜ α) = 0.
We will now show that
∂ξ
∂α|π1=π1(α) < 0. First, rewrite equation (17) as
0 = α(E[ask
1|I buy in 1, π
1,2 traders] − E[E[ask




1|I buy in 1, π
1,1 trader] − E[E[ask
2|I buy in 2, π
1,H1]|π
1,1 trader]).
Observe that when the trader is alone in the market, he can perfectly forecast both ask
prices, and the second term on the right-hand side is (1−α)(a(π2,π1;1/ 2)−a(π1,1;1/ 2)). This
term is positive at π1 = π1(α) because, by Step 3 (c) of the proof of Theorem 1, π1(α) < Π
and thus (i) by Lemma 4, a(π1,1; 1/2)) > a(Π,1; 1/2)), and (ii) by Lemmas 1 and 4,
a(π2,π1; 1/ 2) = EV (π∗(π1); 1/ 2) < EV (π∗(Π); 1/ 2) = a(Π,1; 1/ 2). For (22) to hold, the ﬁrst
17Chebyshev’s inequality states that if a1 ≥ a2 ≥ ... ≥ an and b1 ≥ b2 ≥ ... ≥ bn, then 1
n
Pn









. Here we use n = 2, a1 = 1,a2 = l1 and b1 = 1,b2 = l2.
18In the proof of Theorem 1, we omitted dependence on α.
39term in (22) must then be negative at π1 = π1(α). Finally, observe that, for a ﬁxed π1,
conditional expectations in equation (22) are independent of α.
The partial derivative
∂ξ
∂α|π1=π1(α) is the partial derivative of the right hand side of (22).
The above discussion implies that it equals the ﬁrst term in parentheses of (22) minus the
second term in parentheses of (22), and that
∂ξ
∂α|π1=π1(α) < 0.
B.4 Spreads: Proof of Proposition 2
Recall that the spread is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the ask and the bid price, and
to facilitate the comparison, in period 2 we look at the spread that obtains conditional on





suﬃces to show that (i) ask
1 > ask
2 and (ii) ask
1 increases in α and ask
2 decreases in α.
To see (i) observe that ask
1 = a(π1,1;1/ 2) and, conditional on no transaction in period 1,
ask
2 = a(π2,π1; 1/ 2). The inequality then follows by the same argument as in the proof of
Proposition 1.
To see (ii) observe ﬁrst that both π1 and π2 decrease in α by Proposition 1. By Step 3
of the proof of Theorem 1, π1 > π∗(1); Lemma 4 then implies that a(π1,1;1/ 2) decreases in
π1 and thus increases in α. Further, by Step 1 of the same proof, a(π2(π1),π1;1/ 2) = π∗(π1);
it increases in π1 by Lemma 4 and thus decreases in α.
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41Result Economic description Parameter Observable Reaction
Proposition 1









level of competition ∀α > 0 spread
1 > spread
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level of competition ∀α ≥ 0 vol
2 > vol
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Table 1: Summary of the Model’s Empirical Predictions
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